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If you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem. But if you 
owe a million, it has.1
 The financial crisis has exposed numerous fraudulent investment schemes 
affecting creditors and eroding society’s confidence in investing institutions.2 When 
Ponzi schemes collapse, it becomes necessary to take an accounting of any assets and 
typical response by the government to investment fraud has been to immediately seek 
the appointment of a receiver to protect the dissipation of assets.3 A district court and 
receiver can freeze the assets of the corporation involved in the investment scheme 
and issue anti-litigation injunctions that would prevent a drain of its assets before the 
scheme fully collapses.4 However, this action opens the door to the equity receivers 
seeking to liquidate assets outside of the federal bankruptcy laws. Legal commentators 
have critiqued regulatory agencies for applying inconsistent approaches to recover and 
distribute assets from fraudulent investment schemes.5 And protections granted under 
the bankruptcy laws are applied inconsistently or not at all when receivers conduct 
liquidation outside of the confines of bankruptcy laws.6 Receivers are not compelled 
to follow bankruptcy laws, and receivers often ignore critical bankruptcy protections 
for creditors or use certain provisions in a piecemeal fashion.7 When the purpose of a 
receivership is to seek the eventual liquidation of assets, the receiver should not be 
utilized “beyond the point necessary to get the estate into the proper forum for 
1. See Down Communism’s Sink, The Economist, Feb. 13, 1982, at 11.
2. See Courtney J. Linn, Recovering Assets in Investment Fraud Cases, 45 Crim. L. Bull. 744 (2009).
3.   A receiver appointed by the court is a person who by such appointment becomes an 
officer of the court to receive, collect, care for, administer, and dispose of the property 
or the fruits of the property of another or other brought under the orders of the court by 
the institution of proper action or actions.
 Ralph Ewing Clark, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Receivers § 11(a) (3d ed. 1959). 
“A primary purpose of appointing a receiver is to conserve the existing estate.” Esbitt v. Dutch-American 
Mercantile Corp., 335 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1964).
4. See generally Linn, supra note 2.
5. See id.
6. The United States has a long and storied history of bankruptcy jurisprudence, which ref lects changing 
societal values and pragmatic considerations on the role of bankruptcy laws in mediating disputes 
among debtors and creditors. For a comprehensive historical overview of bankruptcy law, see generally 
Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History (1935). Bankruptcy laws have been 
revised repeatedly, with the most sweeping changes coming in 1978 and 2005. See generally Elizabeth 
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors: Text, Cases, 
and Problems 106 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which amended the 1978 Act). Title 11 of the 
U.S. Code is hereafter referred to as the Bankruptcy Code.
7. See SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1987) (liquidating receivership criticized for 
selective application of bankruptcy rules and procedures); see also Marcus F. Salitore, SEC Receivers v. 
Bankruptcy Trustees: Liquidation by Instinct or Rule, Am. Bankr. Inst. J. (2003), available at http://www.
martindale.com/members/Article_Atachment.aspx?od=1113797&id=39844&filename=asr-39846.pdf.
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8 While the right to file bankruptcy might not be 
a fundamental right,9 it is unique in that establishing uniform laws on bankruptcy is 
one of the few enumerated powers that Congress has, provided in Article I, Section 8, 
of the U.S. Constitution.10 Regardless of whether the right to file bankruptcy is a 
fundamental one, how far and under what circumstances may a court infringe on a 
creditor’s right to force a debtor into bankruptcy?
 In SEC v. Byers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a case of first 
impression upheld the authority of a federal district court to issue an anti-litigation 
injunction precluding nonparty creditors from filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions 
in the context of a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) receivership.11 
This case comment contends that the Second Circuit’s holding relies on reasoning 
from dissimilar cases, ignores a trend within the Second Circuit protecting the rights 
of debtors and creditors under the Bankruptcy Code, and circumvents congressional 
intent that entities be liquidated pursuant to, and with the protections afforded under, 
the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the Second Circuit’s holding vests district courts with too 
much discretion in administering SEC receivers past the point of marshaling the 
assets. When receivers liquidate assets outside of the consistent and unwavering 
protections provided under bankruptcy laws, the result leads to inconsistent protections 
for creditors and sporadic application of the bankruptcy laws.
 On August 11, 2008, the SEC filed a complaint against Steven Byers, Joseph 
Shereshevsky, and multiple affiliates of Wextrust Capital, LLC, alleging their 
involvement in a complex Ponzi scheme12 that involved over 240 Wextrust affiliates 
8. Lankenau v. Coggeshall & Hicks, 350 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1965) (citing Esbitt v. Dutch-American 
Mercantile Corp., 335 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1964)).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (the right to bankruptcy discharge is “hardly akin 
to free speech or marriage or to those other rights, so many of which are imbedded in the First Amendment, 
that the Court has come to regard as fundamental”). But see Sidney Goldstein, If You Sue Me, I Will File 
Bankruptcy and You Can’t Stop Me! Maybe Not!, LexisNexis Corporate & Securities Law Community 
(Jan. 19, 2011, 9:39 AM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/corpsec/blogs/bus-law-analysis/
archive/2011/01/19/if-you-sue-me-i-will-file-bankruptcy-and-you-can-t-stop-me-maybe-not.aspx (“The 
right to file bankruptcy is a fundamental right, provided in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution.”); 
Mark G. Douglas, No Unwaivable Right to File an Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition, Jones Day (Sept.-Oct. 
2010), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/604d1dca-ac8e-4554-be1e-4593fd75798b/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/ad410f61-1a0a-41cf-9135-45e94bde6201/JD_NYI_4300913_1_Involuntary%20
petition%20injunction%20article%20for%20September_October%202.pdf (“The ability to file for 
bankruptcy protection and receive a discharge of debts is sometimes perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a 
fundamental (if not constitutional) entitlement under U.S. law.”).
10. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
11. 609 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2010); see also supra note 3. 
12. A Ponzi scheme typically involves a pyramid of business ventures that are unsupported by profit-making 
entities. Ponzi Schemes—Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). The operator of the scheme usually lures investors with 
promises of high yields. The operator then diverts money to itself, and occasionally to investors to create 
the illusion of success. Id. Once the scheme collapses, as it inevitably does, the victims are unable to recoup 
their initial investment. See generally Mitchell Zuckoff, Ponzi’s Scheme: The True Story of a 
Financial Legend (2005); David A. Gradwohl & Karin Corbett, Equity Receiverships for Ponzi Schemes, 
34 Seton Hall Legis. J. 181 (2010).
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operating both in the United States and abroad.13 The Wextrust affiliates controlled 
real estate investments, commodity funds, and diamond mine investments in South 
Africa.14 The scheme allegedly defrauded investors out of approximately $255 
million.15 Because the scheme was so complex, involving many affiliates and types of 
assets, the SEC moved immediately to seek a restraining order freezing the assets of 
the defendant-debtors.16 The district court issued a temporary restraining order and 
appointed a receiver to maintain the status quo while determining whether the 
Wextrust affiliates should file for bankruptcy.17
 On October 24, 2008, the district court issued the preliminary injunction. The 
creditors’ committees18 argued that the district court did not have the authority to 
enjoin nonparty creditors from filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition.19 Applying 
the reasoning of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits,20 the district court denied the 
creditors’ committees’ motion to modify the order’s provision that enjoined nonparty 
creditors from filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition.21 In Liberte Capital Group, 
LLC v. Capwill, the Sixth Circuit held that a court has the power to enjoin nonparties 
from filing suits against assets of a receivership.22 The circuit court reasoned that a 
court’s jurisdictional basis to enjoin nonparties “arises from its power over the 
assets.”23 Similarly, in SEC v. Wencke, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s anti-
litigation injunction barring suits against the receivership entities.24 The Ninth 
13. Byers, 609 F.3d at 89–90.
14. SEC v. Byers (Byers II), 637 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
15. Byers, 609 F.3d at 90.
16. Id.
17. Id. The August 11, 2008 order included the challenged provision that was subsequently incorporated 
into the October 24, 2008 preliminary injunction order. The order provides, in pertinent part, that
no person or entity, including any creditor or claimant against any of the Defendants, or 
any person acting on behalf of such creditor or claimant, shall take any action to 
interfere with the taking control, possession, or management of the assets, including, 
but not limited to, the filing of any lawsuits, liens, or encumbrances, or bankruptcy 
cases to impact the property and assets subject to this order. 
 SEC v. Byers (Byers I), 592 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
18. The creditors’ committees included the International Ad-Hoc Committee of Wextrust Creditors and 
the International Consortium of Wextrust Creditors.
19. Byers I, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 535. The Bankruptcy Code provides for procedures that enable creditors to, 
under certain conditions, force the debtor into Bankruptcy Court. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
20. Liberte Capital Group, LLC v. Capwill, 462 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2006); SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363 
(9th Cir. 1980).
21. Byers I, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 537. The district court modified the order to allow any party or nonparty to 
request an order from the court permitting that party to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition upon 
showing that the petition would benefit the receivership estate. Id.
22. 462 F.3d at 552.
23. Id.
24. 622 F.2d at 1365.
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Circuit reasoned that if a district court did not have authority to issue injunctions, 
receivers would be unable to protect assets under their administration.25 The creditors’ 
committees in Byers appealed the holding to the Second Circuit. Before the Second 
Circuit heard arguments, the district court was presented with a plan for liquidation 
of the receiver’s assets.26 In July 2009, the district court approved the receiver’s plan 
to liquidate.27
 On June 15, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, 
following a similar line of reasoning.28 The Second Circuit reasoned that, although 
injunctions are to be used sparingly, the complex nature of the Wextrust Ponzi 
scheme, combined with the dispersed assets of the receiver’s estate, created a situation 
in which an injunction would assist the district court and receiver in maintaining 
“maximum control over the assets” for the purpose of conserving the existing estate.29 
The court first established that district courts have broad equitable powers to appoint 
receivers in the context of violations of federal securities law.30 The receiver is able to 
marshal the assets of the estate in order to prevent further collapse of the Ponzi 
scheme and dissipation of any remaining assets and to conduct an accounting of 
those assets. The court then reasoned that, even assuming an absolute right of 
creditors to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition, the receivership “accomplishes 
what a bankruptcy would,” that is, the receivership acts as an automatic stay would in 
a bankruptcy proceeding.31 But, as this case comment later points out, the Bankruptcy 
Code provides for many more protections. The circuit court nevertheless concluded 
by noting that the district court’s power to issue anti-litigation injunctions barring 
25. Id. at 1369–70.
26. Byers II, 637 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
27. Id. at 184.
28. SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2010).
29. Id. at 92–93.
30. See id. at 92. While other statutory schemes allow district courts to appoint receivers, e.g., the Small 
Business Act, the federal securities law does not expressly provide for such relief and, as a result, the 
district court under federal securities law must use its equitable power to grant the use of a receiver when 
doing so is ancillary to other securities enforcement actions. See SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 
F.2d 431, 436–38 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Although neither the Securities Act of 1933 nor the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 explicitly vests district courts with the power to appoint trustees or receivers . . . 
[d]istrict courts possess broad equitable powers to grant ‘ancillary relief . . . where necessary and proper 
to effectuate the purposes of ’ the securities laws.”); see also George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in 
Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 865, 867 (1983) (“Neither the 
language nor the legislative history of the securities laws expressly empowers the SEC to seek, or the 
courts to [grant] . . . ancillary relief.”).
31. Byers, 609 F.3d at 92. Under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the filing of a bankruptcy petition 
triggers the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). The stay broadly halts all judicial, administrative, 
transactions so that the receiver or trustee may conduct a thorough accounting of the assets and liabilities 
of the underlying organization. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 362.03 § 362(a) (Matthew Bender & 
Co., Inc. ed., 16th ed. 2011). However, certain express governmental actions are exempted from the 
automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
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debtors and creditors from exercising rights and remedies granted by the Bankruptcy 
Code is a “power to be exercised cautiously.”32
 This case comment contends that the court in Byers erroneously held that district 
courts have the authority to issue anti-litigation injunctions that preclude creditors 
from filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions in the context of SEC receivership cases 
for three reasons. First, the court improperly relied on the incongruent reasoning 
employed in Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases. Moreover, in a case of first impression, 
the court erred in rejecting more direct precedent in favor of cases that ultimately 
failed to address the novel issue presented in Byers. Second, the court ignored a clear 
trend in the Second Circuit of narrowing the circumstances in which federal receivers 
may circumvent the rights and procedures afforded to creditors under the Bankruptcy 
Code. Third, the court’s holding frustrates the intent of Congress and the purpose of 
the Bankruptcy Code.
 First, the Byers court’s reliance on cases from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits was 
erroneous because those circuits did not decide the novel issue presented in Byers. The 
Sixth Circuit in Liberte Capital Group, LLC v. Capwill did not decide the court’s 
ability to enjoin bankruptcy filings during the pendency of an anti-litigation 
injunction;33 rather, the Sixth Circuit found that multiple insurance companies were 
in contempt of the court’s blanket, or general, anti-litigation injunction when they 
sued for damages on claims of fraud.34 In Liberte, Liberte Capital Group and Alpha 
Capital Group, both viatical settlement companies, were under the control of an Ohio 
district court-appointed receiver.35 The Ohio district court issued an anti-litigation 
injunction. Three nonparty insurance companies requested declaratory relief against 
the viatical settlement companies now in control of the receiver, alleging that Liberte 
and Alpha fraudulently obtained insurance policies from them. The insurance 
insurance companies sought pecuniary damages related to policies paid to the 
receiver.36 The Ohio court held that filing the suit in Delaware was a violation of the 
Ohio court’s blanket litigation injunction.37 Although the language of the anti-
litigation injunction in Liberte was similar to the injunction issued in Byers, the parties 
in Liberte did not seek to avail themselves of the rights and remedies of the Bankruptcy 
Code.38 They were simply seeking to recover damages. Liberte, therefore, did not 
32. Byers, 609 F.3d at 91.
33. 462 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2006).
34. Id. at 546–47.
35. A viatical settlement “allows you to invest in another person’s life insurance policy. With a viatical 
settlement, you purchase the policy (or part of it) at a price that is less than the death benefit of the 
policy. When the seller dies, you collect the death benefit.” Viatical Settlements, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/answers/viaticalsettle.htm (last modified May 21, 2004).
36. Liberte, 462 F.3d at 555.
37. Id. at 557. 
38. In Liberte, the parties were held in contempt for filing a common law fraud cause of action. Id. There is 
a distinction, however, between common law and court causes of action and involuntary bankruptcy 
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decide the narrow issue raised in Byers: whether a district court has the authority to 
issue an anti-injunction barring the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions by 
creditors of the corporation asserting their rights under the Bankruptcy Code.
 In Liberte, the court implied that if the insurance companies sought to file an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition, as opposed to the common law fraud suit, the district 
court should defer to congressional intent as promulgated by “broad and detailed 
statutes to guide federal courts in the disposition of [bankruptcy] cases.”39 Indeed, the 
court distinguished cases in which district courts may exercise their equitable powers 
from cases in which they may not.40 The Sixth Circuit noted, “There remains a class 
of cases, however, in which the federal courts may exercise their equitable powers and 
institute receiverships over disputed assets in suits otherwise falling within the federal 
court’s jurisdiction, but which fall outside the statutory bankruptcy proceedings or other 
legislated domain.”41 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit indicated that the court’s power 
in the context of the bankruptcy “realm” is limited.42 Thus, the Sixth Circuit did not 
address whether a district court may enjoin nonparty creditors from filing an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition in the context of a receivership.
 The Byers court also erred in following the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit 
in SEC v. Wencke, which did not involve creditors seeking to avail themselves of the 
protections afforded under the Bankruptcy Code and therefore also did not confront 
the novel issue presented in Byers.43 In Wencke, Walter Wencke acquired control of a 
corporation, Sun Fruit, Ltd., through fraudulent means.44 Mr. Wencke then began 
transferring assets from Sun Fruit to another of his corporations.45 Next, Mr. Wencke 
successfully petitioned a Nevada state court to place Sun Fruit into receivership and 
appoint himself as receiver, requesting the appointment in order to be in a position to 
cover up his fraud.46 He then immediately sought to hide his prior asset transfers.47 
In July 1976, the SEC brought an action against Mr. Wencke for violating federal 
securities law.48 The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring further 
petitions governed by Title 11 of the United States Code. Some authors argue that this distinction raises 
serious concerns over whether anti-litigation injunctions can be said to encompass the filing of a petition 
“governed exclusively by [the Bankruptcy Code].” See Richard D. Trenk & Adam Wolper, Effects of SEC 
v. Byers on Creditors’ Rights, Law360 (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.law360.com/realestate/articles/183372/
effects-of-sec-v-byers-on-creditors-rights (emphasis added).
39. Liberte, 462 F.3d at 551. 
40. Id.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. See id. 
43. SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980).
44. Id. at 1365.






proceedings against the federal receiver in order to take custody of the estate and 
audit Mr. Wencke’s companies.49 A nonparty sought possession of property under 
the control of Sun Fruit and sought to obtain a judgment in state court based on Sun 
Fruit’s breach of a lease agreement.50 Before the state court entered a final judgment 
against Sun Fruit (now under control of the SEC receiver), the federal district court 
entered the stay prohibiting any proceedings against entities or assets within the 
receiver’s control.51
 The Ninth Circuit held that, generally, district courts derive their authority to 
enjoin parties from bringing litigation from “the inherent power of a court of equity 
to fashion effective relief.”52 As in Byers, the court in Wencke issued a general anti-
litigation injunction in the context of a securities fraud action. In Wencke, however, 
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to “reexamine the necessity 
for a stay.”53 The circuit court specifically noted that even though the company in 
question was not insolvent or in bankruptcy, its creditors (here, the party suing on the 
lease) wanted to file claims against it.54 Thus the Ninth Circuit implied, though it 
did not decide, that the circumstances in Wencke, i.e., creditors suing an entity in 
receivership, may not justify a continuation of the injunction.55
 Second, the circuit court in Byers summarily rejected the Sixth Circuit’s holding 
in In re Yaryan Naval Stores Co. that held that creditors were not held in contempt of 
an anti-litigation injunction where the creditors sought to declare the debtor bankrupt 
under the bankruptcy laws.56 Instead, the Byers court found that a later case, Royal 
Business, which held that “a debtor subject to a federal receivership has no absolute 
right to file a bankruptcy petition,” rejected the holding in In re Yaryan.57 Royal 
Business, however, did not address the enjoining of creditors seeking to file an 
In re Yaryan specifically held that a court 
could not enjoin. In so holding, the Second Circuit, in a case of first impression, 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 1367.
51. Id. at 1366.
52. Id. at 1369.
53. Id. at 1375.
54. Id.
55. See id. (questioning whether the anti-litigation injunction maintained the status quo). “Although Sun 
Fruit is not now insolvent or in bankruptcy proceedings . . . many creditors and other parties want to bring 
suit against it. Accordingly, it is not apparent to us that the stay as applied to Superior simply maintains 
the status quo.” Id. (emphasis added).
56. See SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting the holding of In re Yaryan, 214 F. 563 (6th 
Cir. 1914)). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a debtor had to be declared “a bankrupt” by the court 
before the bankruptcy proceeding began. This provision did not survive the revisions of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978. See generally Warren, supra note 6.
57. See Byers, 609 F.3d at 92 (quoting United States v. Royal Bus. Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12, 15–16 (2d Cir. 
1983)).
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ignored more direct precedent, i.e., In re Yaryan, in favor of cases that failed to 
address the issue presented in Byers.
 In In re Yaryan, the Sixth Circuit reviewed an Ohio district court order declaring 
Yaryan Naval Stores bankrupt.58 In In re Yaryan, a district court in Georgia appointed 
a receiver to take control of the ailing corporation and issued an anti-litigation 
injunction barring any persons or entities from commencing proceedings against the 
receiver’s estate.59 Three unsecured creditors nevertheless filed an action in Ohio 
district court without obtaining leave from the Georgia district court presiding over 
the receivership, seeking to have the company declared bankrupt.60 The Sixth Circuit 
held that these creditors were not in contempt of the Georgia district court’s 
injunction.61 The court pronounced that the Bankruptcy Act conferred “[r]ights and 
privileges so positively bestowed [that they] cannot be destroyed, denied, or abridged 
by any power save that which created and brought them into being.”62 The court 
further noted that the “creditors were also clearly within their rights when they 
applied for and obtained . . . an order adjudging the company a bankrupt. Indeed . . . 
the court of bankruptcy could not have denied the relief which it alone had 
jurisdiction and authority to grant.”63 The Byers court, however, did not find In re 
Yaryan controlling because it interpreted a subsequent Second Circuit case, United 
States v. Royal Business Funds Corp., as standing for the circuit’s explicit rejection of 
In re Yaryan.64 This comment contends, however, that the Byers court erred in holding 
that Royal Business should be interpreted to reject In re Yaryan.
 In Royal Business, the Second Circuit reviewed an appeal from the district court 
staying a Chapter 11 petition by the debtor-defendant Royal Business Funds Corp. 
(“Royal”), which received numerous loans from the Small Business Administration 
(SBA).65 After several requests by Royal to the SBA to recapitalize the company were 
denied, insolvency appeared imminent.66 The SBA requested that a receiver be 
appointed to administer the corporation.67 In response, the board of directors voted 
to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protections.68 However, before the district court, 
the parties entered into a stipulation and agreed to an order that gave the court, inter 
alia, exclusive jurisdiction over the assets of Royal and included a clause enjoining 
58. In re Yaryan, 214 F. at 564. 
59. Id. at 563–64.
60. Id. at 564.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 565.
63. Id.
64. See SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Royal Bus. Funds Corp., 724 
F.2d 12, 15–16 (2d Cir. 1983)).
65. 724 F.2d at 13.
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 15.
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any other litigation, which, in relevant part, stated that “all Courts having any 
jurisdiction thereof are hereby enjoined from taking any further action until further 
Order of this Court.”69 Royal subsequently sought to file for bankruptcy despite 
consenting to the court’s order. The Second Circuit held that “a debtor subject to a 
federal receivership has no absolute right to file a bankruptcy petition.”70 But the 
court’s reasoning heavily relied on the fact that the liquidation under the receiver was 
already “substantially under way.”71
 Interestingly, and pertinent to a proper analysis of the facts in Byers, the court in 
Royal Business purposefully limited its holding by noting three “compelling” 
circumstances weighing in favor of affirming the district court’s power to enjoin a 
bankruptcy filing by the debtor.72 First, the SBA was the primary creditor and “no 
significant creditors other than SBA” existed.73 The court reasoned that permitting 
the debtors to file for bankruptcy protection, after the SBA had relied on the 
receivership in issuing millions of dollars in new loans to the struggling company, 
would deter the SBA in the future from providing loans to struggling companies 
near insolvency.74 Second, the debtor consented to the receivership after negotiations. 
Here, the court stated, citing In re Yaryan, that it “by no means intend[s] to disturb 
the general rules that a debtor may not agree to waive the right to file a bankruptcy 
petition.”75 Third, and most notably, the court distinguished the Royal case from 
situations where the bankruptcy petition may be filed by someone other than the 
debtor, implying a different analysis or standard would apply in those situations.76
 Because the analysis in Royal Business applied to a case that involved a voluntary 
petition, the court’s reasoning does not provide any guidance to cases involving 
involuntary petitions. In Royal Business, the court reasoned that because the receiver’s 
primary purpose is to maintain the status quo and “improve the company’s fortunes,” 
the debtor had no absolute right to file a bankruptcy petition.77 Additionally, the 
court qualified its holding by noting that Royal did not present any reasons, other 
than the entity’s unqualified right, to file a voluntary petition and avail itself of the 
69. Id. at 14 n.3.
70. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
71. Id. “The receiver ha[d] been operating the company for over a year.” Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The fact that the SBA was the primary creditor is particularly important because, as a result of the 
negotiated decision to choose a federal receivership, Royal received an additional $3.5 million dollars in 
new SBA loans. See id.
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id.; see also In re Federal Shopping Way, Inc., 433 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1970); In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698 
(S.D.N.Y. 1933) (“The agreement to waive the benefit of bankruptcy is unenforceable. To sustain a 
contractual obligation of this character would frustrate the object of the Bankruptcy Act.”); In re 
Madison, 184 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (“[A]n agreement not to file bankruptcy is 
unenforceable because it violates public policy.”).
76. Royal Business, 724 F.2d at 16.
77. Id. 
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privileges and protections of the Bankruptcy Code. What is more, the court noted 
that “no public or private interest is served by allowing Royal to repudiate the 
arrangements it made with the SBA,”78 emphasizing that the court based its holding 
on the fact that the SBA relied on the mutual agreement to appoint a receiver. 
Finally, the appointment of a federal receivership was expressly provided for by 
should not be ignored. A provision of the Small Business Act states that the district 
court “may . . . take exclusive jurisdiction of the licensee . . . and the assets thereof, 
wherever located.”79 This language is noticeably absent in the securities laws.80
 Byers is distinguishable from Royal Business. In Byers, none of the three 
“compelling” circumstances set out in Royal Business were present. In Byers, the 
Wextrust affiliates were beyond resuscitation and the purpose of the receiver did not 
involve improving the company’s fortunes.81 Additionally, in Byers, there was no 
reliance factor to justify precluding creditors from filing a bankruptcy petition. 
Moreover, the situation that the court in Royal Business implied would caution against 
enjoining the filing of a bankruptcy petition, i.e., the presence of creditors seeking to 
file an involuntary bankruptcy petition, was present in Byers. The Second Circuit in 
Royal Business effectively carved out a narrow exception to the “general rules that a 
debtor may not agree to waive the right to file a bankruptcy petition, that the pendency 
of an equitable receivership rarely precludes a petition in bankruptcy, or that equity 
receiverships should not ‘perform the functions of the bankruptcy court.’”82
 Third, the Second Circuit in Byers ignores a clear trend within the Second Circuit 
cautioning against the use of SEC receiverships as an alternative to bankruptcy because 
bankruptcy procedures “are much better designed to protect the rights of interested 
parties.”83
liquidate assets outside of the procedures and protections of the Bankruptcy Code.84 In 
78. Id.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 687c(b) (2006).
80. Compare id. § 687c(b), with section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (granting the district 
court the power to issue injunctive relief, but not expressly providing for use of a receivership. In order 
to use a receivership, the SEC must seek “ancillary relief ” from the district court). See also SEC v. 
Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972) (“Despite the absence of explicit 
statutory authority, however, we repeatedly have upheld the appointment of trustees or receivers to 
effectuate the purposes of the federal securities laws.”); Dent, supra note 30, at 867 (“Neither the 
language nor the legislative history of the securities laws expressly empowers the SEC to seek, or the 
courts to [find] justification for ancillary relief.”). 
81. See SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2010).
82. Royal Business, 724 F.2d at 15 (citations omitted) (quoting Esbitt v. Dutch-American Mercantile Corp., 
335 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1964)).
83. Esbitt, 335 F.2d at 143.
84. See Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 2008); SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 
437 (2d Cir. 1987); SEC v. S&P Nat’l Corp., 360 F.2d 741, 750–51 (2d Cir. 1966); Lankenau v. 
Coggeshall & Hicks, 350 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1965); Esbitt, 335 F.2d at 143. But cf. SEC v. Credit 
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each instance, the court questioned the efficacy and jurisdiction of equity receivers 
operating into the congressionally legislated realm of debtor and creditor law.
 In Esbitt v. Dutch-American Mercantile Corp., the Second Circuit expressed strong 
reservations about using federal securities law receivers to liquidate corporations.85 In 
Esbitt, the SEC receiver of an insolvent corporation brought suit to collect a debt 
owed from Dutch-American Mercantile Corp.86 The SEC receiver was marshaling 
the assets of that the company, which was “hopelessly insolvent” and almost fully 
liquidated by the time the appeal reached the Second Circuit.87 Dutch-American 
argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the 
parties were not diverse.88 The only way the court had jurisdiction was if the debt 
collection suit, normally brought in state court or under the Bankruptcy Code, was 
ancillary to the SEC action. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding 
of proper jurisdiction.89 The court noted, however, that “[w]e see no reason why 
violation of the Securities Act should result in the liquidation of an insolvent 
corporation via an equity receivership instead of the normal bankruptcy procedures, 
which are much better designed to protect the rights of interested parties.”90 In so doing, the 
court created a narrow exception to the use of SEC receivers presiding over estate 
liquidations when a corporation is insolvent and the liquidation is nearly completed.91
 In a second case, SEC v. S&P National Corp., the SEC filed suit against S&P 
National, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act and seeking the 
appointment of a receiver to prevent further fraud.92 The court affirmed the 
appointment of an equity receiver, noting that the purpose of the receiver was not to 
promptly liquidate assets but “promptly to install a responsible officer of the court 
who could bring the companies into compliance with the law .  .  . and preserve the 
corporate assets.”93 Notably, the circuit court stated, “If the only purpose of the 
receivership were to bring about a quick liquidation, we might feel otherwise.”94 Thus 
the circuit court implied that bankruptcy court is the proper venue when liquidation 
Bancorp, Ltd., No. 99 civ. 11395, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17171, at *89 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2000); Byers 
II, 637 F. Supp. 2d 166, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that, notwithstanding Eberhard and Am. Bd. of 
Trade, the approval of the liquidation plan in context of the SEC receivership was within the district 
court’s equitable authority). 
85. 335 F.2d at 143.
86. Id. at 142.
87. Id. at 143.
88. Id. at 142.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 143 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
91. See id.; see also SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 437 (2d Cir. 1987).
92. 360 F.2d 741, 743 (2d Cir. 1966).
93. Id. at 750–51.
94. Id. at 750.
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is the purpose of the receivership. Unlike Byers, in S&P National there was no 
attempt by creditors to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition.
 In another case, Lankenau v. Coggeshall & Hicks, the court stated that SEC 
receiverships “should not be continued, in a case involving insolvency, beyond the 
court.”95 More recently, the Second Circuit in Eberhard v. Marcu similarly stated that 
“the power of a securities receiver is not without limits.”96 The court in Eberhard 
espoused the principles that the SEC receivership is not an appropriate alternative to 
bankruptcy and that district courts should not use receivers to liquidate estates.97 The 
Eberhard court noted that “because receivership should not be used as an alternative to 
bankruptcy, we have disapproved of district courts using receivership as a means to 
process claim forms and set priorities among various classes of creditors.”98
 Of particular guidance was the Second Circuit’s pronouncement in SEC v. 
American Board of Trade, Inc., holding that the appointment of a securities receiver 
was within the district court’s discretion in order to protect the assets of the American 
Board of Trade (ABT) entities.99 The district court also authorized the receiver to 
liquidate the assets.100 Although the appellant did not appeal from the order 
authorizing the liquidation, the Second Circuit noted, in dicta, that the order was 
“sufficiently linked to the appointment of an interim receiver to warrant [an]  .  .  . 
expression of [its] views on the liquidation.”101 The circuit court noted a trend in 
several Second Circuit cases criticizing the use of equity receivers as an alternative to 
bankruptcy.102 Such criticisms include the “burden of processing proof-of-claim 
forms filed by thousands of noteholders and other creditors, of setting priorities 
among classes of creditors, and of administering sales of real property, all without 
the aid of either the experience of a bankruptcy judge or the guidance of the 
bankruptcy code.”103 The circuit court concluded by commanding that in future SEC 
actions involving receivers, the SEC should “bring [the Second Circuit’s] views, as 
stated in [SEC v. American Board of Trade] and other decisions, to the attention of the 
district court before the court embarks on a liquidation through an equity 
receivership.”104 The circuit court reiterated that the only exception to using receivers 
95. 350 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1965) (citing Esbitt, 335 F.2d at 141, 143) (holding that the federal court may 
stay the attachment of assets of the equity receiver in concurrent state court proceeding).
96. 530 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 1965).
97. See id. (citing Lankenau, 350 F.2d at 63).
98. Id. (citing SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 437–38 (2d Cir. 1987)).
99. 830 F.2d at 436.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 436–37; see also supra notes 84–108 and accompanying text (discussing the trend in several Second 
Circuit cases).




to liquidate assets outside of bankruptcy is when the liquidation is virtually 
completed,105 which can be read as an attempt to reign in the transformation of 
federal district courts and receivers into quasi-bankruptcy courts.106
 In addition to the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Trust Deed & 
Mortgage Exchange v. SEC has found that an SEC receiver’s power to liquidate assets 
outside of the umbrella of the bankruptcy laws should be limited to very exceptional 
circumstances, holding that
there is no apparent reason here why the violation of the [securities laws] 
should lead to a different type of final liquidation than that which is had for 
the normal corporate bankrupt. In true bankruptcy, procedures are better 
geared for creditors and depositors to give them a day in court and protect 
their rights.107
 These cases demonstrate that where, as in Byers, the necessary purpose of the 
receiver was the eventual liquidation of the assets (once the receiver made a full 
accounting of the estate), the proper forum for liquidation is the bankruptcy courts. 
SEC receiverships “should not be continued, in a case involving insolvency, beyond 
bankruptcy court.”108
 The Second Circuit in Byers ignored this trend of cases that raise serious doubts 
as to the appropriateness of using SEC receivers to circumvent the established 
procedures of the Bankruptcy Code in overseeing the liquidation of an entity. As a 
result, future SEC receivers have precedent supporting their authority to fully 
liquidate a debtor’s assets under the receiver’s management. Though the court framed 
the issue as driven by “equitable” considerations, this is undesirable because receivers 
could arbitrarily employ liquidation or other procedures in an ad hoc manner. In 
Byers, the SEC receiver concluded that filing for bankruptcy would be “inequitable.”109 
The district court judge noted, “[a]lthough the [decision by the receiver that 
105. “The reason we have acquiesced in the past  .  .  . is that by the time the issue had reached us, the 
liquidation was usually near termination.” Id. at 437. This exception is echoed by other circuits that 
make clear that liquidation outside of bankruptcy should not become standard practice. See SEC v. 
Lincoln Thrift Ass’n, 577 F.2d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Our decision is to a large extent controlled by 
the consideration that the liquidation proceedings were in an advanced stage before appeal was brought 
to this Court. We do not, therefore, view this case as a precedent for approving receivership liquidations 
under the supervision of the district court rather than under the jurisdiction of the court in bankruptcy.”); 
SEC v. Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475, 480 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding the district court’s order refusing to 
vacate a receivership because the receiver had already made substantial progress toward liquidating the 
corporation and the district court had ordered an early pro rata distribution of the assets); see also Esbitt 
v. Dutch-American Mercantile Corp., 335 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1964).
106. See Am. Bd. of Trade, 830 F.2d at 438 (“[T]he court has taken upon itself the burden of processing proof-
of-claim forms filed by thousands of noteholders and other creditors, of setting priorities among classes 
of creditors, and of administering sales of real property, all without the aid of either the experience of a 
bankruptcy judge or the guidance of the bankruptcy code.”).
107. 285 F.2d 162, 182 (9th Cir. 1960).
108. Lankenau v. Coggeshall & Hicks, 350 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1965) (citing Esbitt, 335 F.2d at 143).
109. Byers II, 637 F. Supp. 2d 166, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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bankruptcy would be inequitable] is a close one that gives me pause, in the end I 
agree.”110 By ignoring the Second Circuit trend, Byers changed the focus from 
congressional intent as understood under the Bankruptcy Code to considerations of 
equitable results for investors. The district court noted that it was guided by the 
principle that “equality is equity.”111 Equity, however, is a f leeting concept; surely not 
all creditors will approve of what the SEC receiver believes is an “equitable” 
distribution of assets. Besides, Congress has already balanced competing interests 
and created a “complete, coordinated and integrated mechanism for orderly 
liquidation.”112 And, as one commentator points out, the use of equity receivers 
results in incremental jurisdictional advances, such as liquidating assets outside of 
the Bankruptcy Code, into legislated schemes for which Congress has already 
weighed the competing interests.113 Through ancillary relief, which provides the 
basis for federal receivers in the context of securities law, the district court is the sole 
promulgator of the receiver’s powers.114 In effect, the federal court places its wisdom 
and experience in front of Congress’s, circumventing its intent to “establish . . . 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.”115
 In not permitting creditors to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition, the Second 
Circuit frustrates congressional intent that the liquidation or restructuring of the 
debtor corporation takes place pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy 
Code’s legislative history notes that “once a proceeding to liquidate assets has been 
commenced, the debtor’s creditors have an absolute right to have the liquidation (or 
reorganization) proceed in the bankruptcy court under bankruptcy laws with all of 
the appropriate creditor . . . protections that those laws provide.”116
 The right to file bankruptcy is statutorily provided under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Contrast this to the lack of statutory relief that the SEC has in the context of federal 
securities law violations, which requires the SEC to seek ancillary relief from district 
courts.117 The “twin” purposes of the Bankruptcy Code are to provide creditors with 
fair payment and to establish a “fresh start” for debtors.118 The Bankruptcy Code 
110. Id. at 175.
111. Id. at 176 (quoting Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924)).
112. Salitore, supra note 7.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
116. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 323–24 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6280 (emphasis added); 
see also supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text.
117. See Gary L. Goodenow, Litigating the SEC’s Ancillary Enforcement Remedies Following Central Bank and 
its Progeny, 21 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 67 (1997).
118. See IRS v. Energy Res. Co. (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 230 (1st Cir. 1989), aff ’d, 495 U.S. 545 
(1990) (discussing the Bankruptcy Code’s twin purposes, which are to ensure “fair payment to creditors 
and provide the [debtor] with an opportunity to make a ‘fresh start’”) (internal citation omitted); In re 
Whitfield, 290 B.R. 302, 306 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (“The Bankruptcy Code ref lects a careful 
balance of debtors’ rights and creditors’ remedies.”); In re Cason, 190 B.R. 917, 927 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
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provides numerous provisions that evince congressional intent to give bankruptcy 
courts a plethora of tools to carry out the “twin” purposes of the Code.119 This case 
comment is primarily concerned with the principle that creditors receive fair payment, 
yet the Second Circuit’s holding in Byers gives too much discretion to district courts 
and leaves creditors subject to proceedings outside of a bankruptcy court, without 
adequate protection of their interests ensured by Congress under the Bankruptcy Act. 
In the context of an SEC receivership, the receiver’s focus is on protecting investors.120 
Secured and unsecured creditor rights are noticeably absent in such a proceeding and 
receivership proceedings lack established bankruptcy protections and processes.121 For 
instance, under receivership liquidation, notice and hearing requirements vary or are 
absent depending on the federal district in which the liquidation is proceeding.122 
Conversely, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code requires a bankruptcy trustee to file a 
motion seeking the court’s approval of a proposed asset sale, in addition to the 
subsequent “notice and a hearing” on the motion seeking a sale.123 Receiverships also 
lack the creditor protections of the “absolute priority rule” outlined in Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.124 In addition, the equity receivership may have difficulty voiding 
transfers and conveyances of assets on behalf of the debtor’s creditors made prior to the 
appointment of the receiver, such as priority payments.125 Under the Bankruptcy Code, 
section 548 permits a trustee to avoid fraudulent transfers that occur within two years 
before a bankruptcy filing.126 Section 547 permits the bankruptcy trustee to “clawback” 
priority payments made within ninety days of a bankruptcy filing.127
1995) (“The Bankruptcy Code as originally enacted carefully balanced creditors’ property rights and 
debtors’ fresh start.”).
119. See infra notes 126–27, 131–39 (discussing additional protections and procedures noticeably absent in 
federal receiverships).
120. See Byers II, 637 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The overriding goal . . . should be fairness to the 
defrauded investors, and forcing this case into bankruptcy would . . . be inconsistent with that goal.”).
121. See Trenk & Wolper, supra note 38.
122. See Salitore, supra note 7.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006). The bankruptcy court considers arguments for and against the proposed sale 
and either approves the sale or denies approval. See generally Timothy W. Walsh, Section 363: A Useful 
Tool for Asset Sales in Bankruptcy, DLA Piper (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.dlapiper.com/section-363:a-
useful-tool-for-asset-sales-in-bankruptcy/.
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2006); see also Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In 
re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 463 (2d Cir. 2007) (“This provision codifies the judge-made 
absolute priority rule, which provided that any plan of reorganization in which stockholders [a]re 
preferred before the creditor, [is] invalid.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
absolute priority rule in the Code establishes a hierarchy of payment among competing classes of 
creditors and provides an avenue for dissenting creditors to reject a Chapter 11 reorganization plan if the 
creditors believe the plan is not “fair and equitable” with respect to their claims.
125. See, e.g., Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 770–72 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining rules under which a receiver 
may “claw back” money from investors in a Ponzi scheme). 
126. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2006).
127. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
1615
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 56 | 2011/12
 The Byers court reasoned that even if there was an “unwaivable” right for creditors 
to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition, the receivership accomplishes what 
bankruptcy proceedings would, i.e., the protection of the assets of the estate.128 But 
that is only part of the value of bankruptcy proceedings; bankruptcy provides 
numerous protections for both debtors and creditors.129 And courts have generally 
held that injunctions arising from such receiverships are improper to the extent that 
they prevent debtors and creditors from availing themselves of the rights and 
procedures afforded by the Bankruptcy Act.130 What is more, the Bankruptcy Code 
expressly provides discretion for bankruptcy courts to remand a case back to the 
federal district court if “the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better 
served.”131 Therefore, the discretion to send a case back to federal district courts 
should be in the hands of the bankruptcy court rather than in the hands of the 
district court, where it can be used to arbitrarily pick what is equitable while 
circumventing the rights and procedures afforded to creditors under the Code.
 The Bankruptcy Code unambiguously contemplates that the mere existence of 
an equity receiver does not preclude debtors or creditors from filing bankruptcy 
petitions.132 Section 543 of the Code would otherwise be superfluous.133 Section 543 
128. SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2010).
129. See infra notes 131–39 and accompanying text (discussing the protections and procedures available).
130. See Jordan v. Indep. Energy Corp., 446 F. Supp. 516, 529–30 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (“An order restricting 
access to the bankruptcy court, other than as specifically provided by Congress in the Bankruptcy Act, 
would not be in the public interest.”); see also In re Naftalin & Co., 315 F. Supp. 463, 468 (D. Minn. 
1970), vacated on other grounds, 469 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1972) (“It has been directly held that the 
appointment of a receiver in an action by the [SEC] would not deter the liquidation of the entity in a 
bankruptcy proceeding.”); accord In re Yaryan Naval Stores Co., 214 F. 563, 565 (6th Cir. 1914) (“[T]he 
intention of Congress [is] to confer the rights and privileges of the Bankruptcy Act upon all persons and 
all corporations except those expressly exempted from its operation.”); In re Donaldson Ford, Inc., 19 
B.R. 425, 428–29 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (“It has generally been held in this circuit that the pendency 
of an equity receivership will not ordinarily prevent a corporation from filing a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy.”). Therefore, “[a]ny conflicting injunction order must yield to the Congressional intent to 
grant bankruptcy relief.” Jordan, 446 F. Supp. at 527; see also Rafael Ignacio Pardo, Comment, Bankruptcy 
Court Jurisdiction and Agency Action: Resolving the NextWave of Conflict, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 945 (2001).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (2006).
132. See id. § 543 (a)–(b). This section of the Code provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a)  A custodian with knowledge of the commencement of a case under this title 
concerning the debtor may not make any disbursement from, or take any action in 
the administration of, property of the debtor  .  .  . in the possession, custody, or 
control of such custodian, except such action as is necessary to preserve such 
property.
(b)  A custodian shall (1) deliver to the trustee any property of the debtor held by or 
transferred to such custodian . . . that is in such custodian’s possession, custody, or 
control on the date that such custodian acquires knowledge of the commencement 
of the case.
 Id. (emphasis added).
133. Section 543 could be read as preempting a district court from precluding creditors from filing 
bankruptcy petitions. However, Bankruptcy courts are Article I courts under the Constitution. Further, 
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requires a receiver,134 “with knowledge of the commencement of a case under [the 
Bankruptcy Code,]” to deliver any property of the debtor to the bankruptcy trustee.135 
Additionally, section 303(b) describes the specific requirements that creditors must 
meet in order to file an involuntary petition,136 reflecting the American preference 
for voluntary petitions.137 No other section of the Bankruptcy Code expressly 
precludes creditors from filing involuntary petitions, assuming the creditor meets the 
threshold demands of section 303. Section 305 grants bankruptcy courts the power 
to abstain a proceeding under Title 11 if “the interests of creditors and the debtor 
would be better served.”138 Section 105 gives the bankruptcy court broad power to 
“issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of this title.”139 Congress deliberately provided bankruptcy courts with the 
power and capacity to sift through complex corporate reorganizations and 
structures.140 But the Byers court reasoned that while injunctions are to be used 
manage hundreds of entities spread over two continents arising out of a Ponzi scheme 
injunction may assist the district court and receiver in maintaining maximum control 
over the assets. However, the court’s reasoning is inapposite. In fact, other circuits 
have reasoned that complex matters are precisely situations that bankruptcy laws are 
courts have generally interpreted section 543 of the Code to preempt only state proceedings involving 
receivers and not federal receivers. See, e.g., In re Watts, 190 U.S. 1 (1903).
134. Section 543 of the Code uses the term “custodian.” However, “custodian” is defined in section 101(11) 
as meaning a “receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a case of proceeding 
not under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(A) (emphasis added).
135. Id. § 543 (a)–(b). 
136. See id. § 303 (“An involuntary case may be commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title.”).
137. See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 6, at 367 (discussing the differences in legal systems that result 
in Europeans filing more involuntary petitions than Americans who have always favored voluntary 
petitions). This is further reinforced by other subsections of 303 providing attorney’s fees to debtors if 
the court dismisses an involuntary petition or punitive damages if an involuntary petition is deemed to 
be filed in “bad faith.” See 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). 
138. Id. § 305(a)(1). This is a provision in the Code that contemplates situations similar to the situation 
presented in Byers. The existence of this provision weighs in favor of precluding federal courts from 
enjoining creditors from filing involuntary petitions under the Code because Congress provided 
bankruptcy courts with the power to abstain and remand the case back to the district court where the 
estate would be subject to the receivership; it is an equitable safeguard that requires the bankruptcy 
judge to weigh burdens and benefits of abstention. See, e.g., In re Euro-American Lodging Corp., 357 
B.R. 700, 729 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (addressing seven factors for the court to weigh in determining 
whether abstention is appropriate).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
140. See Gilchrist v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 262 F.3d 295, 304 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that Congress 
intended to favor the bankruptcy process because the bankruptcy court has better tools to deal with 
complex litigation).
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meant to address.141 Byers presents precisely the complex issues that are best addressed 
by the Bankruptcy Code.
 The Second Circuit in Byers ignored a clear trend of cases narrowing the 
circumstances allowing for the use of receivers to circumvent the rights and 
procedures afforded creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. The Second Circuit’s 
holding in Byers gives too much discretion to district courts and leaves creditors 
subject to proceedings outside of a bankruptcy court, without adequate protection of 
their interests ensured by Congress under the Bankruptcy Act. In the context of an 
SEC receivership, the receiver’s focus is on protecting investors.142 But secured and 
unsecured creditor rights are noticeably absent in such a proceeding143 and receivership 
proceedings lack consistent and unwavering bankruptcy protections and processes.
141. Erti v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.), 765 F.2d 343, 347 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (“[T]o whatever extent a conflict may arise between the authority of the Bankruptcy Court 
to administer this complex reorganization and the authority of the District Court to administer 
consolidated pretrial proceedings, the equities favor maintenance of the unfettered authority of the 
Bankruptcy Court.”). 
142. See Byers II, 637 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The overriding goal . . . should be fairness to the 
defrauded investors, and forcing this case into bankruptcy would . . . be inconsistent with that goal.”).
143. See Trenk & Wolper, supra note 38.
